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SET-THEORETIC MEREOLOGY
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND MAKOTO KIKUCHI
Abstract. We consider a set-theoretic version of mereology based
on the inclusion relation ⊆ and analyze how well it might serve as a
foundation of mathematics. After establishing the non-definability
of ∈ from ⊆, we identify the natural axioms for ⊆-based mereol-
ogy, which constitute a finitely axiomatizable, complete, decidable
theory. Ultimately, for these reasons, we conclude that this form
of set-theoretic mereology cannot by itself serve as a foundation of
mathematics. Meanwhile, augmented forms of set-theoretic mere-
ology, such as that obtained by adding the singleton operator, are
foundationally robust.
In light of the comparative success of membership-based set theory in
the foundations of mathematics, since the time of Cantor, Zermelo and
Hilbert, a mathematical philosopher naturally wonders whether one
might find a similar success for mereology, based upon a mathematical
or set-theoretic parthood relation rather than the element-of relation ∈.
Can set-theoretic mereology serve as a foundation of mathematics?
And what should be the central axioms of set-theoretic mereology?
We should like therefore to consider a mereological perspective in set
theory, analyzing how well it might serve as a foundation while identi-
fying the central axioms. Although set theory and mereology, of course,
are often seen as being in conflict, what we take as the project here
is to develop and investigate, within set theory, a set-theoretic inter-
pretation of mereological ideas. Mereology, by placing its focus on the
parthood relation, seems naturally interpreted in set theory by means
of the inclusion relation ⊆, so that one set x is a part of another y, just
in case x is a subset of y, written x ⊆ y. This interpretation agrees
with David Lewis’s [Lew91] interpretation of set-theoretic mereology
in the context of sets and classes (see also [Hel09]), but we restrict our
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attention to the universe of sets. So in this article we shall consider
the formulation of set-theoretic mereology as the study of the structure
〈V,⊆〉, which we shall take as the canonical fundamental structure of
set-theoretic mereology, where V is the universe of all sets; this is in
contrast to the structure 〈V,∈〉, usually taken as central in set theory.
The questions are: How well does this mereological structure serve as
a foundation of mathematics? Can we faithfully interpret the rest of
mathematics as taking place in 〈V,⊆〉 to the same extent that set the-
orists have argued (with whatever degree of success) that one may find
faithful representations in 〈V,∈〉? Can we get by in mathematics with
merely the subset relation ⊆ in place of the membership relation ∈?
Ultimately, we shall identify grounds supporting generally negative
answers to these questions. On the basis of various mathematical re-
sults, our main philosophical thesis will be that the particular under-
standing of set-theoretic mereology via the inclusion relation ⊆ cannot
adequately serve by itself as a foundation of mathematics. Specifically,
theorem 2 and corollary 4 show that ∈ is not definable from ⊆, and
we take this to show that one may not interpret membership-based
set theory itself within set-theoretic mereology in any straightforward,
direct manner. A counterpoint to this is provided by theorem 5, how-
ever, which identifies a weak sense in which ⊆ may identify ∈ up to
definable automorphism of the universe. That counterpoint is not de-
cisive, however, in light of question 7 and its resolution by theorem 12,
which shows that set-theoretic mereology does not actually determine
the ∈-isomorphism class or even the ∈-theory of the ∈-model in which
it arises. For example, we cannot determine in ⊆-based set-theoretic
mereology whether the continuum hypothesis holds or fails, whether
the axiom of choice holds or fails or whether there are large cardinals
or not. Initially, theorem 8 may appear to be a positive result for
mereology, since it identifies precisely what are the principles of set-
theoretic mereology, considered as the theory of 〈V,⊆〉. Namely, ⊆
is an atomic unbounded relatively complemented distributive lattice,
and this is a finitely axiomatizable complete theory. So in a sense, this
theory simply is the theory of ⊆-based set-theoretic mereology. But
upon reflection, since every finitely axiomatizable complete theory is
decidable, the result actually appears to be devastating for set-theoretic
mereology as a foundation of mathematics, because a decidable theory
is much too simple to serve as a foundational theory for all mathe-
matics. The full spectrum and complexity of mathematics naturally
includes all the instances of many undecidable decision problems and
so cannot be founded upon a decidable theory. Finally, corollary 11
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shows that the structure consisting of the hereditarily finite sets un-
der inclusion forms an elementary substructure of the full set-theoretic
mereological universe
〈HF,⊆〉 ≺ 〈V,⊆〉 .
Consequently, set-theoretic mereology cannot properly treat or even
express the various concepts of infinity that arise in mathematics.
Let us briefly clarify the foundational dialectic of this article. We
study set-theoretic mereology within set theory itself, studying 〈V,⊆〉
as it is defined in set theory, by working in ZFC, for example, although
much weaker set theories would suffice for our analysis. Every model〈
M,∈M
〉
of ZFC gives rise to the associated canonical model
〈
M,⊆M
〉
of set-theoretic mereology. So we make claims about ⊆ when we are
able to prove them in our ∈-based set theory. If a mereologist desires
instead to work axiomatically purely within set-theoretic mereology it-
self, then in light of theorem 8 there will be no disagreement on the
fundamental mereological truths, if ⊆ is regarded as an atomic un-
bounded relatively complemented distributive lattice, since this is a
complete theory. To be sure, some of the axiomatizations of mereology
that have been proposed in the literature do not agree with those ax-
ioms, particularly on the issue of atomicity as we discuss in section 4;
but to the extent that they disagree with those elementary set-theoretic
properties of inclusion ⊆, we regard them as concerned with another
kind of mereology and not with ⊆-based set-theoretic mereology, the
topic on which we are focussing. In our membership-based set theory,
meanwhile, we argue that there are substantive mathematical concepts
and truths that are not captured by the mereological theory of ⊆, and
for this reason, it does not serve adequately as a foundation of mathe-
matics.
Let us also briefly remark on the distinction between the parthood
relation and the proper parthood relation, as some mereologists pre-
fer to take the proper-part relation as fundamental, rather than the
parthood relation. In set theory, this distinction amounts to the dis-
tinction between the inclusion relation ⊆, which is reflexive, and the
proper-subset relation (, which is irreflexive. These two relations, how-
ever, are easily interdefinable in the first-order language of set theory
as follows:
x ⊆ y ←→ x ( y ∨ x = y
x ( y ←→ x ⊆ y ∧ x 6= y.
For our conclusions, therefore, it does not seem to matter which of
these relations we consider to be fundamental. In particular, ∈ is not
definable from either of them, and set-theoretic mereology is decidable,
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whether one is considering the theory of 〈V,⊆〉 or of 〈V,(〉. Hence-
forth, therefore, we shall without loss of generality focus on the reflexive
relation ⊆.
Finally, although we argue in this article that the particular formula-
tion of set-theoretic mereology interpreted via the inclusion relation ⊆
cannot by itself serve adequately as a foundation of mathematics, nev-
ertheless we should like to remark that there may be alternative mereo-
logical perspectives in set theory, using a different interpretation of the
parthood relation, that do allow it to serve as a suitable foundation
of mathematics. For example, theorem 13 shows that if one augments
set-theoretic mereology with the singleton operator a 7→ {a}, then it
becomes interdefinable with ∈-based set theory, and therefore just as
adequate as ∈ in foundations. Meanwhile, there are still other inter-
pretations of mereology in set theory. See [Var15] for a general survey
of mereology.
1. Non-definability of ∈ from ⊆
Our initial task, of course, is to settle the question of whether the two
set-theoretic relations ∈ and ⊆ might be definable from one another or
otherwise bi-interpretable in set theory. For if the two relations were
interdefinable, then we would reasonably see them as fundamentally
equivalent in their capacity to serve as a foundation of mathematics,
since either would serve as a foundation for the other, and this would
settle the entire issue. Furthermore, elementary classical set theory
already provides one direction, since ⊆ is easily definable from ∈ in set
theory via
x ⊆ y ←→ ∀z (z ∈ x→ z ∈ y).
So the question really is whether one may conversely define ∈ from ⊆.
At the CTFM 2015 in Tokyo, the second author specifically asked for
a counterexample model:
Question 1 (Kikuchi). Can there be two models of set theory with
different membership relations, but the same inclusion relation?
More specifically, he asks for models of set theory 〈V,∈〉 and 〈V,∈∗〉
on the same underlying universe of sets V , with different membership
relations ∈6=∈∗, but for which the correspondingly defined inclusion
relations ⊆ and ⊆∗, respectively, are identical. The answer is yes, and
indeed, every model of set theory has many such alternative member-
ship relations with the same inclusion relation:
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Theorem 2. In any universe of set theory 〈V,∈〉, there is a definable
relation ∈∗, different from ∈, such that 〈V,∈∗〉 is a model of set the-
ory, in fact isomorphic to the original universe 〈V,∈〉, for which the
corresponding inclusion relation
u ⊆∗ v ←→ ∀a (a ∈∗ u→ a ∈∗ v)
is identical to the usual inclusion relation u ⊆ v.
Proof. The result requires very little about the theory of 〈V,∈〉, and
even extremely weak set theories suffice. Let θ : V → V be any de-
finable non-identity permutation of the universe, such as the permu-
tation that swaps ∅ and {∅} and leaves all other sets unchanged. Let
τ : u 7→ θ " u = { θ(a) | a ∈ u } be the function determined by point-
wise image under θ. Since θ is bijective and definable, it follows that τ
is also a bijection of V to V , since every set is the θ-image of a unique
set. Furthermore, τ is an automorphism of 〈V,⊆〉, since
u ⊆ v ←→ θ " u ⊆ θ " v ←→ τ(u) ⊆ τ(v).
The first author had used this idea a few years ago in [Ham13] in order
to prove that there are always many nontrivial ⊆-automorphisms of
the set-theoretic universe, as expressed in corollary 3. Note that since
τ({a}) = {θ(a)}, it follows that any instance of nontriviality θ(a) 6= a
in θ leads immediately to an instance of nontriviality in τ .
Using the map τ , we define a ∈∗ b ←→ τ(a) ∈ τ(b). By definition,
therefore, and since τ is bijective, it follows that τ is an isomorphism
of the structures 〈V,∈∗〉 ∼= 〈V,∈〉, and so in particular, 〈V,∈∗〉 has the
same theory as 〈V,∈〉, making it just as much a model of set theory as
〈V,∈〉 is. Let us show next that ∈∗ 6=∈. Since θ is nontrivial, there is
an ∈-minimal set a with θ(a) 6= a (one can take a = ∅ for the particular
θ that we provided above). By minimality, θ " a = a and so τ(a) = a.
But as mentioned, τ({a}) = {θ(a)} 6= {a}. So we have a ∈ {a}, but
τ(a) = a /∈ {θ(a)} = τ({a}) and hence a /∈∗ {a}. So the two relations ∈
and ∈∗ are different.
Meanwhile, consider the corresponding subset relation. Specifically,
u ⊆∗ v is defined to mean ∀a (a ∈∗ u → a ∈∗ v), which holds if and
only if ∀a (τ(a) ∈ τ(u) → τ(a) ∈ τ(v)); but since τ is surjective, this
holds if and only if τ(u) ⊆ τ(v), which as we observed at the beginning
of the proof, holds if and only if u ⊆ v. So the corresponding subset
relations ⊆∗ and ⊆ are identical, as desired. 
Corollary 3 ([Ham13]). Set-theoretic mereology is not rigid. That
is, in every model of set theory 〈V,∈〉, there are numerous nontrivial
definable automorphisms of the inclusion relation τ : 〈V,⊆〉 ∼= 〈V,⊆〉.
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Proof. This is precisely what the construction of the map τ in the proof
of theorem 2 provides. Note that distinct choices of θ lead to distinct
such ⊆-automorphisms τ . 
Another way to express what is going on in the proof is that τ is
an isomorphism of the structure 〈V,∈∗,⊆〉 with 〈V,∈,⊆〉, and so ⊆ is
in fact the same as the corresponding inclusion relation ⊆∗ that one
would define from ∈∗. Corollary 3 contrasts with the fact that ZFC
proves that 〈V,∈〉 and indeed any transitive set or class is rigid, since
if pi : V → V is an ∈-respecting bijection, there can be no ∈-minimal
set a with pi(a) 6= a.
Corollary 4. One cannot define ∈ from ⊆ in any model of set theory,
even allowing parameters in the definition.
Proof. For any parameter z, let us choose z-definably the bijection θ
in the proof of theorem 2 to be nontrivial, while still having θ " z = z.
For example, perhaps θ swaps z and {z}, and leaves all other sets
unchanged. From this, it follows by the proof of theorem 2 that the
map τ : a 7→ θ " a is an ⊆-automorphism, and our choice of θ ensures
that τ(z) = z. So τ preserves every relation definable from ⊆ and
parameter z. But τ does not preserve ∈, and consequently, ∈ must not
be definable from ⊆ using parameter z. 
Nevertheless, for a counterpoint, we claim that there is a weak sense
in which the isomorphism type of 〈V,∈〉 is implicit in the inclusion rela-
tion ⊆, namely, any other class relation ∈∗ having that same inclusion
relation is isomorphic to the ∈ relation.
Theorem 5. Assume ZFC in the universe 〈V,∈〉. Suppose that ∈∗ is a
definable class relation in 〈V,∈〉 for which 〈V,∈∗〉 is a model of set the-
ory (a weak set theory suffices), such that the corresponding inclusion
relation
u ⊆∗ v ←→ ∀a (a ∈∗ u→ a ∈∗ v)
is the same as the usual inclusion relation u ⊆ v. Then the two mem-
bership relations are isomorphic
〈V,∈〉 ∼= 〈V,∈∗〉 .
Proof. Since a singleton set {a} has exactly two subsets with respect
to the usual ⊆ relation—the empty set and itself—this must also be
true with respect to the inclusion relation ⊆∗ defined via ∈∗, since we
have assumed ⊆∗=⊆. Since only singletons have exactly two subsets,
the object {a} must also be a singleton with respect to ∈∗, and conse-
quently there is a unique object η(a) such that x ∈∗ {a} ←→ x = η(a).
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Since every object has a singleton with respect to ∈∗, it follows that η
is surjective, and since every object has a unique singleton with respect
to ∈∗, it follows that η is injective. So η : V → V is bijective. Let
θ = η−1 be the inverse permutation.
Unwrapping things, we may observe that
a ∈ u ←→ {a} ⊆ u ←→ {a} ⊆∗ u ←→ η(a) ∈∗ u,
and so a ∈ u ←→ η(a) ∈∗ u. By taking inverses, we deduce for any
sets b and u that
b ∈∗ u ←→ θ(b) ∈ u.
Using ∈-recursion, let us define
b∗ = { θ(a∗) | a ∈ b }.
This is the step of the proof where we need ∈∗ to be a definable class
with respect to ∈, in order that the class function η and hence also θ
are classes with respect to ∈, so that we may legitimately undertake ∈-
recursion using them. We do not actually need that ∈∗ is definable in
〈V,∈〉, but rather we need that ∈∗ is an amenable class to this structure,
in the sense that the axioms of ZFC hold even if we allow a predicate
for ∈∗. For example, the argument would work in Go¨del-Bernays set
theory, provided that ∈∗ is a class, as we state in corollary 6.
Continuing with the proof, we claim next by ∈-induction that the
map b 7→ b∗ is one-to-one, since if there is no violation of this for the
elements of b, then we may recover b from b∗ by applying θ−1 to the
elements of b∗ and then using the induction assumption to find the
unique a from a∗ for each θ(a∗) ∈ b∗, thereby recovering b. So b 7→ b∗
is injective.
We claim that this map is also surjective. If y0 6= b
∗ for any b, then
there must be an element of y0 that is not of the form θ(a
∗) for any
a, since otherwise we would be able to realize y0 as the corresponding
b∗. Since θ is surjective, this means there is θ(y1) ∈ y0 with y1 6= b
∗ for
any b. Continuing, there is yn+1 with θ(yn+1) ∈ yn and yn+1 6= b
∗ for
any b. Let z = { θ(yn) | n ∈ ω }. Since x ∈
∗ u←→ θ(x) ∈ u, it follows
that the ∈∗-elements of z are precisely the yn’s. But θ(yn+1) ∈ yn, and
so yn+1 ∈
∗ yn. So z has no ∈
∗-minimal element, violating the axiom of
foundation for ∈∗, a contradiction. So the map b 7→ b∗ is a bijection of
V with V .
Finally, we observe that because
a ∈ b←→ θ(a∗) ∈ b∗ ←→ a∗ ∈∗ b∗,
it follows that the map b 7→ b∗ is an isomorphism of 〈V,∈〉 with 〈V,∈∗〉,
as desired. 
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The conclusion is that although ∈ is not definable from ⊆, neverthe-
less, the isomorphism type of ∈ is implicit in ⊆, in the weak sense that
any other class relation ∈∗ giving rise to the same inclusion relation
⊆∗=⊆ is isomorphic to ∈. The proof actually shows the following:
Corollary 6. In Go¨del-Bernays set theory, if ∈∗ is a class binary re-
lation and 〈V,∈∗〉 happens to be a model of set theory and has the
same inclusion relation ⊆∗=⊆ as the usual inclusion relation ⊆ de-
fined from ∈, then 〈V,∈∗〉 is isomorphic to 〈V,∈〉.
As we have mentioned, the argument uses that ∈∗ is a class (so
that we have ZFC in the language of the structure 〈V,∈,∈∗〉), and
it is natural to wonder whether one can omit that hypothesis. For
example, perhaps ∈∗ is not definable in 〈V,∈〉 nor even amenable to
this structure. It would be a much stronger result with philosophical
significance to show that ⊆ can truly identify the isomorphism class
of ∈.
Question 7. Can there be two models of set theory 〈W,∈〉 and 〈W,∈∗〉,
not necessarily classes with respect to each other in the sense of Go¨del-
Bernays set theory, which have the same underlying universe W and
the same inclusion relation ⊆=⊆∗, but which are not isomorphic?
For example, can we arrange that 〈W,∈〉 has the continuum hypoth-
esis and 〈W,∈∗〉 does not? In theorem 12, we prove that the answer
is affirmative. In fact, one can arrange that the models have any de-
sired consistent theories extending ZFC, but with the same inclusion
relation. This result shows that, contrary to what might have been sug-
gested by theorem 5, the inclusion relation ⊆ does not actually identify
the ∈-isomorphism class of the universe, or even the ∈-theory of the
model of set theory in which it arises.
2. Set-theoretic mereology is a decidable theory
Let us turn now to the fact that set-theoretic mereology, considered
as the theory of the structure 〈V,⊆〉, constitutes a decidable theory.
This, on our view, appears to be devastating for any attempt to use set-
theoretic mereology by itself as a foundation of mathematics, a view
we shall discuss further in section §5. Meanwhile, while proving the
decidability result in this section, we shall also identify exactly what is
the complete theory of ⊆-based set-theoretic mereology.
To warm up, consider first the easier case of the set HF of hereditarily
finite sets, which in terms of the von Neumann hierarchy is the same
as HF = Vω. Note that 〈HF,⊆〉 is a lattice order. Furthermore, every
element of HF is a finite subset of HF, a countable set, and every such
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finite subset is realized in HF. Hence, 〈HF,⊆〉 is simply isomorphic to
the lattice of finite subsets of a countable set, such as the collection
of finite subsets of N under inclusion. Such a lattice structure is well-
known to be decidable. This lattice is isomorphic, for example, to the
lattice of square-free natural numbers under divisibility, associating
each square-free number with the set of its prime divisors, and in this
sense, inclusion in HF is analogous to divisibility in arithmetic. The
lattice of divisibility for square-free numbers, in turn, is definable in
the natural numbers 〈N, |〉 under divisibility |, a structure also known
to be decidable; divisibility is definable from multiplication, and 〈N, ·〉
also is decidable. So 〈HF,⊆〉 has a decidable theory.
Let us now consider more generally the full structure 〈V,⊆〉, where
V is the entire set-theoretic universe. We shall prove that this structure
also has a decidable theory, and indeed it will follow from our analysis
that it has exactly the same theory as 〈HF,⊆〉.
Theorem 8. Set-theoretic mereology, considered as the theory of 〈V,⊆〉,
is precisely the theory of an atomic unbounded relatively complemented
distributive lattice, and furthermore, this theory is finitely axiomatiz-
able, complete and decidable.
We shall prove this theorem by means of the more specific quantifier-
elimination argument of theorem 9. These results should be viewed as
partaking in Tarski’s classification of the elementary classes of Boolean
algebras by means of the Tarski invariants (see [CK90, theorem 5.5.10])
and Ersˇov’s extension of that work to the case of relatively comple-
mented distributive lattices [Ersˇ64]. Tarski had used a quantifier-
elimination argument to show the decidability of atomless Boolean
algebras, which led him to the Tarski invariants for all Boolean alge-
bras. Ersˇov’s generalization proceeds by a general technique (described
in [Mon76, theoremf 15.6] and also [BSTW85, theorem 3.1.1]) allowing
him to establish a large number of decidability results. For example,
Ersˇov’s method enabled him to handle a Boolean algebra expanded
by a predicate for a prime ideal (see [Wee89, p. 1054]). The state-
ment and proof of theorem 9 has an affinity with the corresponding
quantifier-elimination result for infinite atomic Boolean algebras, as
in [Poi00, theorem 6.20]; see also [Hod93, p. 66]. So the decidability
result we are claiming here is not new and follows immediately from
Ersˇov’s proof that the theory of relatively complemented distributive
lattices is decidable (regardless of atomicity and unboundedness), and
the quantifier-elimination result is similar to that for infinite atomic
Boolean algebras. Nevertheless, in order to provide a self-contained
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presentation, let us give here a direct elimination-of-quantifiers argu-
ment for the central case of set-theoretic mereology: an atomic un-
bounded relatively complemented distributive lattice.
Theorem 9. If
〈
W,∈W
〉
is a model of set theory with the correspond-
ing inclusion relation ⊆, then 〈W,⊆〉 is an atomic unbounded relatively
complemented distributive lattice, and this theory satisfies the elimina-
tion of quantifiers in the language containing the Boolean operations
of intersection x ∩ y, union x ∪ y, relative complement x − y and the
unary size relations |x| = n, for each natural number n.
Proof. In any model of set theory, the subset relation ⊆ is of course
a partial order and indeed a lattice order, since any two sets a and
b have a least upper bound, the union a ∪ b, and a greatest lower
bound, the intersection a ∩ b. The lattice is distributive, because in-
tersection and union both distribute over the other. The lattice has
a least element ∅, but no greatest element (and this is what we mean
by unbounded; for a relatively complemented distributive lattice, it is
equivalent to saying that it is not a Boolean algebra). The lattice is
relatively complemented, since for any two sets a, b, the difference set
a− b is the complement of b relative to a, meaning that b∩ (a− b) = 0
and a = (a∩b)∪(a−b). The lattice is atomic, since every nonempty set
is the join of the singleton sets below it, and those singletons are atoms
with respect to inclusion. In summary, 〈W,⊆〉 is an atomic unbounded
relatively complemented distributive lattice, and this is what we shall
use for the quantifier-elimination argument.
In any lattice, for any natural number n we may introduce a unary
predicate, which we shall write as |x| = n, which we define to hold
precisely when x is the join of n distinct atoms. For any particular n,
this relation is expressible in the language of lattices, that is, from ⊆
in our case. In our model of set theory, this relation expresses that x
is a finite set with n elements. Similarly, in any lattice let us introduce
the unary predicate denoted |x| ≥ n, which expresses that x admits a
decomposition as the join of n distinct nonzero incompatible elements:
x = y1 ∪ · · · ∪ yn, where yi 6= 0 and yi ∩ yj = 0 for i 6= j. In an atomic
relatively complemented lattice, the relation |x| ≥ n holds just in case
there are at least n atoms a ≤ x. This relation is also definable from
the lattice order.
We shall prove that every formula in the language of lattices is equiv-
alent, over the theory of atomic unbounded relatively complemented
distributive lattices, to a quantifier-free formula in the language of the
order a ⊆ b, equality a = b, meet a∩ b, join a∪ b, relative complement
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a − b, constant 0, the unary relations |x| = n and |x| ≥ n, where n is
respectively any natural number.
We prove the result by induction on formulas. The collection of for-
mulas equivalent to a quantifier-free formula in that language clearly
includes all atomic formulas and is closed under Boolean combina-
tions. So it suffices to eliminate the quantifier in a formula of the
form ∃xϕ(x, . . .), where ϕ(x, . . .) is quantifier-free in that language.
Let us make a number of observations that will enable various simpli-
fying assumptions about the form of ϕ.
Because equality of terms is expressible by the identity a = b ←→
a ⊆ b ⊆ a, we do not actually need = in the language (and here we
refer to the use of equality in atomic formulas of the form s = t where
s and t are terms, and not to the incidental appearance of the symbol
= in the unary predicate |x| = n). Similarly, in light of the equivalence
a ⊆ b←→ |a− b| = 0, we do not need to make explicit reference to the
order a ⊆ b. So we may assume that all atomic assertions in ϕ have
the form |t| ≥ n or |t| = n for some term t in the language of meet,
join, relative complement and 0. We may omit the need for explicit
negation in the formula by systematically applying the equivalences:
¬(|t| ≥ n)←→
∨
k<n
|t| = k and
¬(|t| = n)←→ (|t| ≥ n+ 1) ∨
∨
k<n
|t| = k.
So we have reduced to the case where ϕ is a positive Boolean combi-
nation of expressions of the form |t| ≥ n and |t| = n.
Let us consider the form of the terms t that may arise in the for-
mula. List all the variables x0, x1, . . . , xN that arise in any of the terms
appearing in ϕ, where x0 is the variable x, and consider the Venn
diagram corresponding to these variables. The cells of this Venn dia-
gram can each be described by a term of the form
⋂
i≤N ±xi, which we
shall refer to as a cell term, where ±xi means that either xi appears
or else we have subtracted xi from the other variables. For example,
(x0 ∩ x3) − (x1 ∪ x2 ∪ x5) is a cell term in five variables, describing a
cell of the corresponding Venn diagram. Since we have only relative
complements and not absolute complements, we need only consider the
cells where at least one variable appears positively, since the exterior
region in the Venn diagram is not actually represented by any term.
In this way, every term in the language of relatively complemented lat-
tices is equivalent to a term that is a finite union of such cell terms,
plus ∅ (which could be viewed as an empty union). Note that distinct
cell terms are definitely representing disjoint objects in the lattice.
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i
s
k
t
j
Next, by considering the possible sizes of s − t, s ∩ t and t − s as
illustrated in the diagram above, we may observe the identities
|s ∪ t| = n ←→
∨
i+j+k=n
(|s| = i+ j) ∧ (|s ∩ t| = j) ∧ (|t| = j + k)
|s ∪ t| ≥ n←→
∨
i+j+k=n
(|s| ≥ i+ j) ∧ (|s ∩ t| ≥ j) ∧ (|t| ≥ j + k).
Through repeated application of this, we may reduce any size assertion
about any term t to a Boolean combination of assertions about cell
terms. (Note that size assertions about ∅ are trivially settled by the
theory and can be eliminated.)
Let us now focus on the quantified variable x separately from the
other variables, for it may appear either positively or negatively in such
a cell term. More precisely, each cell term in the variables x, x1, . . . , xN
is equivalent to x ∩ c or c − x, for some cell term c in the variables
x1, . . . , xN , that is, not including x, or to the term x− (x1 ∪ · · · ∪ xN),
which is the cell term for which x is the only positive variable.
We have reduced the problem to the case where we want to eliminate
the quantifier from ∃xϕ, where ϕ is a positive Boolean combination
of size assertions about cell terms. We may express ϕ in disjunctive
normal form and then distribute the quantifier over the disjunct to
reduce to the case where ϕ is a conjunction of size assertions about cell
terms. Each cell term has the form x∩ c or c−x or x− (x1 ∪ · · ·∪xN ),
where c is a cell term in the list of variables without x. Group the
conjuncts of ϕ that use the same cell term c in this way together. The
point now is that assertions about whether there is an object x in
the lattice such that certain cell terms obey various size requirements
amount to the conjunction of various size requirements about cells in
the variables not including x. For example, the assertion
∃x (|x ∩ c| ≥ 3) ∧ (|x ∩ c| ≥ 7) ∧ (|c− x| = 2)
is equivalent (over the theory of atomic unbounded relatively comple-
mented distributive lattices) to the assertion |c| ≥ 9, since we may
simply let x be all but 2 atoms of c, and this will have size at least 7,
which is also at least 3, and the complement c− x will have size 2. If
contradictory assertions are made, such as ∃x (|x∩ c| ≥ 5∧|x∩ c| = 3),
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then the whole formula is equivalent to ⊥, which can be expressed
without quantifiers as 0 6= 0.
Next, the key observation of the proof is that positive assertions
about the existence of such x for different cell terms in the variables
not including x will succeed or fail independently, since those cell terms
are representing disjoint elements of the lattice, and so one may take
the final witnessing x to be the union of the witnesses for each piece.
So to eliminate the quantifier, we simply group together the atomic
assertions being made about the cell terms in the variables without x,
and then express the existence assertion as a size requirement on those
cell terms. For example, the assertion
∃x (|c ∩ x| ≥ 5) ∧ (|c− x| = 6) ∧ (|d ∩ x| ≥ 7),
where c and d are distinct cell terms in the other variables, is equivalent
to
(|c| ≥ 11) ∧ (|d| ≥ 7),
since c and d are disjoint and so we may let x be the appropriate part of
c and a suitable piece of d. The only remaining complication concerns
instances of the term x−(x1∪· · ·∪xN ). But for these, the thing to notice
is that any single positive size assertion about this term is realizable
in our theory, since we have assumed that the lattice is unbounded,
and so there will always be as many atoms as desired disjoint from any
finite list of objects. But we must again pay attention to whether the
requirements expressed by distinct clauses are contradictory.
Altogether, this provides a procedure for eliminating quantifiers from
any assertion in the language of lattices down to the language aug-
mented by unary predicates expressing the size of an object. This
procedure works in any atomic unbounded relatively complemented
distributive lattice, and so the theorem is proved. 
Corollary 10. The theory of atomic unbounded relatively complemented
distributive lattices is complete and decidable.
Proof. Theorem 9 shows that every sentence in this theory is equiv-
alent to a quantifier-free sentence in the expanded language with the
unary size predictes. But since such sentences have no variables, they
must simply be a Boolean combination of trivial size assertions about
0, such as (|0| ≥ 2) ∨ ¬(|0| = 5), and the truth value of all such as-
sertions is settled by the theory. So the theory of atomic unbounded
relatively complemented distributive lattices is finitely axiomatizable
and complete. Every such theory is decidable: given any sentence,
simply search for a proof of it or the negation. 
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Theorem 8 follows from theorem 9 and corollary 10. One can also
view the proof of theorem 9 as providing an explicit decision procedure:
given a sentence, use the procedure to find the quantifier-free equiv-
alent, which will be a trivial assertion about 0, whose truth is easily
determined.
The quantifier-elimination result also has the following consequence,
which unifies theorem 8 with our remarks about HF.
Corollary 11. The structure of hereditarily finite sets HF under inclu-
sion is an elementary substructure of the entire set-theoretic universe
V under inclusion.
〈HF,⊆〉 ≺ 〈V,⊆〉
Proof. These structures are both atomic unbounded relatively comple-
mented distributive lattices, and so they each support the quantifier-
elimination procedure. But they agree on the truth of any quantifier-
free assertion about the sizes of hereditarily finite sets, and so they
agree on all truth assertions about objects in HF in the language
of ⊆. 
3. Mereology does not identify ∈ up to isomorphism
We would like to tie up a loose end from our presentation of theo-
rem 5, which identified a weak sense in which we are able to define the
isomorphism class of ∈ from ⊆. We had left it unsettled in question 7
whether this weak sense could hold more robustly. We should like now
to prove that in fact it does not. The following theorem shows that
⊆-based set-theoretic mereology is unable to distinguish the ∈-theory
of the model of set theory in which it arises, and so ⊆ cannot truly
identify the ∈-isomorphism class of the model in which it resides.
Theorem 12. For any two consistent theories extending ZFC, there
are models 〈W,∈〉 and 〈W,∈∗〉 of those theories, respectively, with the
same underlying set W and the same induced inclusion relation ⊆=⊆∗.
Proof. Suppose that T and T ∗ are two consistent theories extending
ZFC in the language of set theory. Note that by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
theorem, if there are models as stated in the conclusion of the theorem,
then there are countable models like that, and so the conclusion of the
theorem has complexity Σ11 in descriptive set theory. By the Shoenfield
absoluteness theorem, therefore, it follows that the conclusion of the
theorem is absolute to every forcing extension, including forcing exten-
sions where the continuum hypothesis holds. We may therefore assume,
without loss of generality, that the continuum hypothesis holds. It fol-
lows that there are models 〈W,∈〉 and 〈W, ∈ˆ〉 of T and T ∗, respectively,
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which are countably saturated on a common domainW of size ℵ1. That
is, for each of the models and for any countable list of formulas ϕi(x)
using countably many parameters from W , if every finite subcollection
of the formulas is realized in the model, then the whole collection is
realized, meaning that some a in the model satisfies every ϕi(a). It
follows that the corresponding defined structures 〈W,⊆〉 and
〈
W, ⊆ˆ
〉
are also both saturated. By theorem 8, these are both models of the
theory of infinite atomic relatively complemented distributive lattices
with no largest element, and this is a complete theory. In particu-
lar, these two structures are elementarily equivalent and saturated. It
follows by the usual back-and-forth construction that there is an iso-
morphism pi : 〈W,⊆〉 ∼=
〈
W, ⊆ˆ
〉
. To construct pi, simply enumerate
the elements of W as 〈aα | α < ω1〉 and define pi in stages. At stage α,
consider the type of aα in 〈W,⊆〉 using parameters aβ for β < α, and
find an element pi(aα) that realizes the same type over
〈
W, ⊆ˆ
〉
using
parameters pi(aβ); this type is finitely realizable since each instance of
this was part of the earlier types, and therefore it is realized by sat-
uration; we can similarly ensure that pi is surjective, and so it is an
isomorphism pi : 〈W,⊆〉 ∼=
〈
W, ⊆ˆ
〉
, as desired. Given the isomorphism,
define a ∈∗ b just in case pi(a) ∈ˆ pi(b), so that pi : 〈W,∈∗〉 ∼= 〈W, ∈ˆ〉,
and so 〈W,∈∗〉 |= T ∗. Observe that
u ⊆∗ v ←→ pi(u) ⊆ˆ pi(v) ←→ u ⊆ v,
where the first equivalence follows from the fact that pi is an isomor-
phism of 〈W,∈∗〉 with 〈W, ∈ˆ〉, and the second follows from the fact that
pi is an isomorphism of 〈W,⊆〉 with
〈
W, ⊆ˆ
〉
. So 〈W,∈〉 and 〈W,∈∗〉 are
models of T and T ∗, respectively, but the corresponding defined inclu-
sion relations are identical ⊆=⊆∗. 
As a consequence, set-theoretic mereology appears to be oblivious
to the independence phenomenon in set theory, otherwise widespread
in set theory, in that it fails to distinguish between models with ex-
tremely different theories in the usual language of set theory with ∈,
because these models can be identical in the language with only ⊆. In
particular, contrary to what might have been taken as the suggestion
of theorem 5, if we are given the inclusion relation ⊆ of a model of
set theory, we cannot generally identify the isomorphism class of the ∈
relation from which it arose, or even the ∈-theory of that structure.
Given only ⊆, we cannot determine whether the continuum hypothesis
holds or fails or whether there are large cardinals or not (or indeed
even whether there are infinite sets or not).
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4. Mereology with the singleton operator
Until now, we have undertaken what might be described as a study
of a pure set-theoretic mereology, where we have only the inclusion re-
lation ⊆. But it might be natural to consider an expanded mereology,
where we augment the inclusion relation ⊆ by allowing reference also
to other kinds of set-theoretic structure. For example, let us now con-
sider the theory that arises when we augment mereology by adding the
singleton operator s : a 7→ {a}, which maps every object to its own
singleton.
In the context of mereology, this is not as innocent as it may ap-
pear to a contemporary set theorist. Indeed, there is a surprisingly
rich history of confusion and controversy about the singleton con-
cept stretching back into the earliest days of set theory and pre-set-
theory (see [Kan03]), and the concept is controversial in connection
with mereology, from the beginning of the subject. More recently, a
literature of criticism of the singleton has arisen in response to David
Lewis’s [Lew91] development of a class-based set-theoretic mereology.
See [Hel09] and [CK] for further discussion of the singleton and mere-
ological atoms.
What we should like to observe here is merely that if we were to
expand the language by adding the singleton operator s as well as the
inclusion relation ⊆, then we would get a structure that is equally as
powerful as the usual membership-based set theory.
Theorem 13. Every model of membership-based set theory 〈V,∈〉 is
interdefinable with the corresponding singleton-expanded mereological
model 〈V,⊆, s〉.
Proof. For the one direction, we can easily define ⊆ and the singleton
operator s using ∈ as follows:
u ⊆ v ←→ ∀x (x ∈ u→ x ∈ v)
y = s(x) ←→ ∀z (z ∈ y ←→ z = x).
Conversely, we may define ∈ from ⊆ and s via
x ∈ y ←→ s(x) ⊆ y.
So the theorem is proved. 
Thus, this stronger version of mereology, expanded by the singleton
operator, is basically equivalent to membership-based set theory as far
as the foundations of mathematics is concerned. One could express,
for example, that the ∈-universe 〈V,∈〉 satisfied ZFC plus certain large
cardinals, by mereological assertions expressed purely in the language
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of inclusion and the singleton operator. One would want to assert that
⊆ is an atomic unbounded relatively complemented distributive lattice,
that s is a bijection of the universe with the ⊆-atoms, but also that
additional properties hold that ensure the axioms of infinity, separation,
power set, replacement and so on.
5. Conclusions
Let us now discuss our philosophical conclusions concerning the suit-
ability of the ⊆-based interpretation of set-theoretic mereology to serve
as a foundation of mathematics. These conclusions grow naturally out
of the mathematical ideas we have presented in the earlier sections of
this article.
Consider first theorem 2 and corollary 4, which show that ∈ is not
generally definable from ⊆ in models of set theory. Although this shows
that ∈-based set theory is not founded upon ⊆-based set theory in a
superficial, direct manner, we do not actually take these results to rule
out ⊆-based set-theoretic mereology as a foundation of mathematics.
Rather, the results merely close off what might have been naively hoped
for as an easy way to establish mereology as a powerful foundation,
namely, the idea that perhaps ∈ and ⊆ were interdefinable. They are
not interdefinable, as the theorem and corollary establish, and so the
easy road is blocked. But in order for ⊆ to serve as a foundation of
mathematics, it is not required for these relations to be interdefinable.
Rather, all that would be required is that we should be able to find
faithful representations of all our other mathematical structures, such
as ∈-based set theory, within the ⊆-based set-theoretic mereology. To
insist that ∈ is definable from ⊆ would be to insist further that the
way that ⊆ serves as a foundation is exactly the inverse of the way
that ∈ happens to serve easily as a foundation for ⊆. But perhaps ⊆
might serve as a foundation for ∈-based set theory in some other way;
perhaps ∈-based set theory is simulated within ⊆-based set theory by
means of a much more complicated interpretation or structure. (In the
end, we don’t believe so, but not solely on the basis of theorem 2 and
corollary 4, which do not seem to rule this out.)
Indeed, hope for such a more complicated but successful interpre-
tation of ∈ within ⊆ might have been buoyed up by theorem 5 and
corollary 6, which seem to suggest that perhaps ⊆-based set-theoretic
mereology might be able to identify the isomorphism class of the ∈
relation. After all, many other non-set-theory-based foundations of
mathematics, such as those originating in category theory, weave the
philosophy of mathematical structuralism into the foundational theory,
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and for these theories it is emphasized that one shouldn’t necessarily be
able to define a mathematical structure such as ∈ directly, but rather
merely identify mathematical structure up to isomorphism. Theorem 5
shows that any two class relations ∈ and ∈∗ with the same ⊆ relation,
provided that ∈∗ is a class with respect to ∈, are isomorphic, and thus
as in corollary 6, it is correct to say as an internal matter of Go¨del-
Bernays set theory, that ∈ is up to isomorphism the only class relation
that forms a model of set theory and gives rise to the actual ⊆ relation.
This is a sense in which ⊆ knows about ∈ up to isomorphism.
But our more considered view is that this is not the same as saying
that ⊆ determines the ∈-isomorphism class of the universe, and the
situation is clarified by theorem 12, resolving question 7. The fact of
the matter is that knowledge of the inclusion relation ⊆ tells you al-
most nothing about the ∈-isomorphism class of the universe in which
it arises. Indeed, theorem 12 shows you can learn very little even about
the ∈-theory of the universe from considering only ⊆, since any two
consistent set theories can have respective models on the same universe
of sets with the same ⊆ relation, even if otherwise they are extremely
different on set-theoretic matters. For example, the continuum hypoth-
esis can hold in one model and fail in another, even when those models
have exactly the same objects and the same ⊆ relation (but different ∈
relations). Similarly, the models can disagree on other set-theoretic
issues, and corollary 11 shows even that one cannot tell if there are
infinite sets or not by looking only at the theory of ⊆. At bottom, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the inclusion relation ⊆ knows very
little set theory.
Nevertheless, what we’ve said so far does not actually seem decisively
to rule out ⊆-based set theory as a foundation, because there is no
requirement that ⊆ need to capture the actual ∈-truth of a model of
set theory in which it might arise. Rather, in foundations we can be
free to find some other faithful simulation of mathematical structure.
So finally, let us come to theorem 8, in which we notice that ⊆-
based set-theoretic mereology is an atomic unbounded relatively com-
plemented distributive lattice and prove that this is a finitely axiomati-
zable, complete theory, which is therefore also decidable. This, on our
view, is devastating for this formulation of mereology as foundational.
We base this view on the following principle, which we should like now
to discuss in further detail.
Nondecidability requirement. If a theory is decidable, then it can-
not serve as a foundation of mathematics.
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If this principle is correct, then since theorem 8 shows that the partic-
ular formulation of set-theoretic mereology via the inclusion relation ⊆
is a decidable theory, we assert that this formulation of mereology can-
not serve as a foundation of mathematics. And a similar argument
will apply to other formulations of mereology, if they lead to a decid-
able theory. For example, Lewis [Lew91] considers a proper-class-based
formulation of set-theoretic mereology that appears to result in an infi-
nite atomic Boolean algebra, which by Tarski’s analysis has a decidable
theory (as in [Poi00, theorem 6.20], which is the Boolean-algebra ana-
logue of theorem 9). So using only the ⊆ relation in that formulation
of set-theoretic mereology would seem similarly to be inadequate as a
foundation. (But Lewis also considers singletons, and in light of theo-
rem 13, allowing the singleton operator would recover ∈ and therefore
be foundationally robust.)
So let us conclude this paper by discussing the grounds that one
might have for the non-decidability requirement. Part of what it means
for a theory to be foundational is that one might find faithful represen-
tations of the principal mathematical structures within that theory. For
example, ∈-based set theory is commonly taken as a possible founda-
tion of mathematics, because set theorists have observed that one can
find within set theory seemingly faithful copies of all the usual math-
ematical structures considered in mathematics, and we can formalize
analogues of all the usual mathematical procedures that mathemati-
cians might employ in connection with those structures. In set theory,
we have a way of talking about ordered pairs and functions and rela-
tions and orders and we can build a copy of the natural numbers and
the rational field and we can build a complete ordered field and so on.
For a theory to be acceptable as a foundation of mathematics, it must
similarly be able to find faithful representations for all the usual math-
ematical structures. In particular, it must have a way of representing
the natural numbers, so that for any particular natural number n, we
would have a corresponding way of referring to the number n in the
theory, and a way of moving from the representation of n to that of
n + 1 and so on with the other arithmetic structure. Similarly, we
would have representations of finite combinatorial objects, including
the operation, say, of Turing machines.
Suppose that we have a theory T that is foundational in the sense
described in the previous paragraph, but also decidable, so that we
have a decision procedure for determining whether a given statement
is provable from T or not. We do not assume that the theory T is
sound, although the representation of arithmetic will mean that it is
∆0-sound. Working in the meta-theory, where the decision procedure
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for T exists, let A and B be a computably inseparable pair of com-
putably enumerable sets. (For this argument, kindly allow us to assume
that the meta-theory is sufficiently strong to deal with computable enu-
merations and the existence of such sets, or rather, the existence of the
programs enumerating them.) So we have particular programs pA and
pB that enumerate the elements of A and B, respectively; these sets
are disjoint; and there is no computable set containing A while disjoint
from B. But in the meta-theory, consider the set C consisting of those
natural numbers n that T proves are enumerated first by pA (or only
by pA) in comparison with pB. Since T is foundational, we are able
to express the operation of the Turing machines pA and pB in the the-
ory. And furthermore, if a number n is actually in A, then it will be
enumerated by pA by some definite computation, which itself would be
faithfully represented in T , and so T will agree that n is enumerated by
pA. Since A and B are disjoint (in the meta-theory), it follows that n
will not be enumerated by pB by any computation of the same length
or shorter, and so since the operation of pB is faithfully represented in
T to that same length, it follows that T will agree that n is enumer-
ated first by pA in comparison with pB. So n will be in C, and thus C
contains A. Similarly, if n is in B, then it is enumerated by pB by some
definite computation, which is faithfully represented in T , along with
all the shorter computations of pA, and so T will agree in this case that
n is not first enumerated by pA, and so n will not be in C. So C con-
tains A and is disjoint from B. Finally, since T is decidable, it follows
that C is computable, and so it is a computable separation of A and
B, contrary to our choice of A and B to be computably inseparable.
So this seems to provide grounds for the non-decidability requirement.
One might summarize the argument as the following elementary fact,
applied in the meta-theory: if a theory T can formalize arithmetic and
is ∆0-sound, then it cannot be decidable, because if it were, we would
be able to find computable separations of computably inseparable sets,
which is a contradiction.
For one final remark, let us highlight a subtle aspect of the argu-
ment we have just given, particularly the distinction between arguing
in the meta-theory in comparison with the object theory, by consid-
ering how the analysis works in the confounding case of the theory
T = ZFC+¬Con(ZFC). If ZFC is consistent, then the incompleteness
theorem shows that T also is consistent. If we regard ZFC as capa-
ble of providing a foundation of mathematics in the sense described
in the previous paragraph, then it would seem that T also, being a
consistent extension of a foundational theory, would similarly be ca-
pable of providing a foundation of mathematics. For if in ZFC we
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can prove the existence of mathematical objects and structures that
faithfully represent our usual mathematical structures, then T being
a stronger theory can also prove the existence of these structures and
more. Although many set theorists regard T as unsound, because it
asserts ¬Con(ZFC), which is to say, T asserts the existence of a certain
finite combinatorial object, the proof of a contradiction in ZFC, which
we don’t expect to find in the meta-theory, nevertheless, this by itself
doesn’t seem to prevent T from being foundational. One can easily see
that T is not a decidable theory, using a computably inseparable pair
of computably enumerable sets, as in the previous paragraph. But the
confounding thing to notice, here, is that while T is not decidable in
the meta-theory, it actually is decidable within the object theory of T
itself. That is, externally, we think T is not decidable, but internally,
arguing in T itself, we think that ZFC and hence also T is inconsistent
and therefore decidable, because T thinks that everything is provable
from T . Our view of this example is that it is not a counterexample
to the non-decidability principle. The theory T is foundational, and
not decidable in the meta-theory, even though T itself thinks that T
is decidable. Ultimately, we may regard T as capable of serving as a
foundation, if an unsound one, because in the meta-theory we do not
actually assert T and we recognize that it is consistent although un-
sound. But a meta-theoretical context in which T is asserted would
not be able to regard T as foundational, since it would look upon T as
inconsistent.
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